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Summary
In order to better understand the tax manipulation decision-making process—both legal uses of tax
deductions and illegal tax evasion—this brief looks at the impact of gain/loss framing. Analysis of tax data
confirms that tax decisions are influenced by “loss aversion.” For instance, taxpayers are more likely to pursue
tax reduction activities when they make a loss smaller, as compared to when they make a gain larger. The brief
looks at tools that policymakers have at their disposal for both deterring tax evasion and making exiting tax
incentives maximally effective. The brief discusses instances when such gain/loss framing interventions might
be deployed, and provides estimates around the size of the revenue responses they may generate. The author
estimates that if tax filers who face losses experienced the lower motivation to manipulate shown by those
facing gains, annual tax revenue would increase by $1.4 billion. Even attempts at marginal interventions,
though smaller in predicted effects, might be financially worthwhile.
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Addressing Personal-Income-Tax 
Manipulation with Tools from 
Psychology
Alex Rees-Jones, PhD
In one form or another, nearly all citizens in modern America face taxes. 
Despite the significant social benefits of taxes, the individual costs of paying 
them are famously aversive.
To combat their aversion to paying taxes, many tax-
payers can exercise some control over their tax bill. 
U.S. tax law includes a rich menu of tax-incentivized 
behaviors, including favorable treatment of mortgage 
interest, retirement savings, and charitable giving, 
among many other provisions. Through undertaking 
these actions, or through remembering to claim credits 
or deductions due for actions already taken, substan-
tial legal tax reductions are possible. More insidiously, 
taxes may be illegally reduced through tax evasion. 
Tax manipulation decisions like these meaningfully 
affect federal revenue. Focusing on illegal evasion, the 
difference between the tax revenue that is believed to 
be due and the tax revenue that is actually collected 
typically exceeds $400 billion per year. When it comes 
to legal manipulation, recent work has documented 
that taxpayers often forgo substantial tax savings to 
avoid the hassle cost of itemizing their tax returns.1 In 
total, enormous sums of money are legally and illegally 
kept out of the tax collector’s hands every year, and 
even greater sums could be if taxpayers chose to do so. 
Improved understanding of the manipulation-
decision-making process can provide tools to policy-
makers, as well as a means to better policy analysis.  
SUMMARY
• Tax manipulation decisions—both legal uses of tax deductions 
and illegal tax evasion—significantly affect federal revenue, 
keeping enormous sums of money out of the tax collector’s 
hands.
• In order to better understand the manipulation decision-making 
process, this brief looks specifically at the impact of gain/loss 
framing on tax manipulation, as part of a larger discussion 
about the tools that policymakers have at their disposal for 
both deterring tax evasion and making existing tax incentives 
maximally effective.
• Analysis of tax data confirms that tax decisions are influenced 
by “loss aversion.” Taxpayers are more likely to pursue tax 
reduction activities when they make a loss smaller, as compared 
to when they make a gain larger. Moreover, it may be possible 
to reframe a taxpayer’s perception of what constitutes a gain 
or a loss, potentially through relatively cheap alterations to 
phrasing or presentation in tax documents.
• The brief discusses instances when such gain/loss framing 
interventions might be deployed, and provides estimates around 
the size of the revenue responses they may generate.
• The author estimates that if tax filers who face losses experi-
enced the lower motivation to manipulate shown by those facing 
gains, annual tax revenue would increase by $1.4 billion. Even 
attempts at marginal interventions, though smaller in predicted 
effects, might be financially worthwhile.
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A long history of research has focused 
on rational incentives that affect these 
decisions, such as the fear of finan-
cial penalties or social sanctions that 
come with audits. In this Issue Brief, 
I will discuss the highlights of my 
recent research,2 which measures the 
importance of a type of psychologi-
cally induced incentive on manipula-
tion: specifically, the impact of gain/
loss framing. This will then shape the 
discussion about the tools which poli-
cymakers may have at their disposal 
both for deterring evasion and for 
making existing tax incentives maxi-
mally effective. 
GAIN/LOSS FRAMING 
AND TAX MANIPULATION 
DECISIONS
A large literature in psychology docu-
ments a robust asymmetry in both 
judgments and decisions: our aversion 
to losses typically outweighs our affec-
tion for equal-sized gains. Marginally 
reducing the size of a loss is com-
mensurately valued more highly than 
marginally increasing the size of a 
gain. These regularities are commonly 
referred to as “loss aversion,” and serve 
as a cornerstone of Daniel Kahneman 
and Amos Tversky’s behavioral model 
of Prospect Theory. Attempts to make 
use of this aversion to losses have 
become a go-to approach for “nudge”-
style interventions, and the literature 
building on this idea prominently con-
tributed to Kahneman’s 2002 Nobel 
Prize in Economics. 
How might loss aversion influence 
tax decisions? Imagine a taxpayer in 
the process of filling out his annual tax 
return shortly before tax day. In this 
process, the taxpayer formally docu-
ments all of his tax-relevant informa-
tion for the previous calendar year. 
The resulting tax liability is compared 
to the taxes already collected through 
employer withholding and earlier 
estimated tax payments. A remaining 
difference nearly always exists, and 
must be settled. This settlement can 
be very naturally framed as a gain or 
a loss. Most taxpayers receive money 
back from the IRS in the form of a 
refund—a literal gain. Remaining 
taxpayers, however, must send a check 
to the IRS to cover the tax that they 
owe—a literal loss. 
To see the potential impact of this 
gain/loss framing, imagine that our 
example taxpayer has a sense of the 
balance that will be due. As he works 
on his tax return, he considers a vari-
ety of options available to manipulate 
the final balance that he will have to 
report. He remembers that he made 
a charitable contribution and knows 
that if he spends time looking through 
his records he can find that documen-
tation and request a deduction. Addi-
tionally, he has a tax-preferred retire-
ment savings plan and knows that if 
he takes the time to add money to this 
plan he might claim an adjustment to 
income. This taxpayer also has income 
from a small business and believes 
that he might get away with illegally 
evading taxes by claiming less business 
income than he actually earned. 
As I explore in my research, loss 
aversion makes two distinct predic-
tions about how this taxpayer would 
think about this set of potential 
manipulation decisions. First, loss 
aversion would lead the taxpayer to 
be more likely to pursue any of these 
tax reduction activities in a situation 
where it makes a loss smaller as com-
pared to when it makes a gain larger. 
Second, loss aversion predicts a sudden 
drop in the incentives to manipulate as 
soon as a loss is turned to a gain. 
Directly examining these predic-
tions is challenging, since the  
taxpayers in question are actively 
concealing their behavior. While 
the pursuit of individual credits and 
deductions is seen in tax records, tax 
evasion is of course observed only in 
cases where the evader is caught. As 
a result, precise measurement of tax 
manipulation is not possible in the 
absence of extremely thorough audit 
data, which are rarely available and 
which would still leave some types of 
evasion undetected.
 1  See Benzarti (2015), “How Taxing is Tax Filing? Leaving 
Money On The Table Because Of Compliance Costs,” 
SSRN Working Paper 2412703.
 2  See Rees-Jones, “Quantifying Loss-Averse Tax Manipu-
lation,” Forthcoming at Review of Economic Studies.
  3  See D. Jones (2012), “Inertia and Overwithholding: Ex-
plaining the Prevalence of Income Tax Refunds,” Ameri-
can Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 4, 158–185.
 4  See, e.g., Shepanski and Shearer (1995), “A Prospect 
Theory Account of the Income Tax Withholding Phenom-
enon,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision 
Processes, 63, pp. 174–186.
 5  See Rees-Jones and Taubinsky (2016), “Tax Psychol-
ogy and the Timing of Charitable Giving Deadlines,” The 
Urban Institute.
NOTES
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As I document in my work, 
however, the presence of loss-averse 
manipulation can be readily detected 
without observing manipulation 
itself. Rather, it can be inferred by 
particular patterns in the shape of the 
distribution of the balance due that is 
reported to the IRS after all manipu-
lation has occurred. As documented 
in Figure 1, the first prediction noted 
above (i.e., that taxpayers are more 
likely to pursue tax reductions when 
they make a loss smaller, as opposed 
to when they make a gain bigger) 
would lead to a “shift” of the loss 
domain of the distribution: the higher 
degree of manipulation would drive 
this portion of the distribution to 
lower values than would be forecasted 
from behavior over gains. The second 
prediction (i.e., that there is a sud-
den drop in the incentive to pursue 
tax manipulation once a loss is turned 
into a gain) would lead to “bunching” 
near the reference point of zero: since 
loss-averse taxpayers’ motivation to 
manipulate drops as soon as they get 
to zero, this would lead to an unduly 
large number of tax returns being 
filed with reported balances close to 
zero. Importantly, the quantitative 
impact of loss aversion on manipula-
tion behavior may be inferred from 
these features of the distribution with 
relatively few assumptions. 
As documented in Figure 2, these 
predicted features are found in the 
distribution of balance due observed 
in tax records. As predicted by the 
model, the distribution of balance 
due is shifted in a manner consistent 
with higher manipulation in the loss 
domain, and significant excess mass 
is seen in the near vicinity of zero 
balance due. This pattern is shown to 
be associated with the pursuit of the 
common tax manipulation opportuni-
ties that can be observed. Further-
more, it is more pronounced among 
higher-income tax filers, who tradi-
tionally pursue the greatest amount 
of tax manipulation. My estimates 
suggest that individuals facing a loss 
pursue an additional $34 of tax reduc-
tions above and beyond what would 
be pursued if they faced a gain. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR 
OVERWITHHOLDING POLICY
Beyond providing a window into  
the psychology surrounding manipu-
lation decisions, these results inform 
several practical questions of tax  
policy design. 
Perhaps most directly, the pres-
ence of this type of gain/loss framing 
can affect the consequences of policies 
that change the rate of overwithhold-
ing. Most taxpayers in America—77% 
in the sample I studied—find that 
they are overwithheld on tax day, 
meaning that the taxes already with-
held from their paycheck by their 
employer were in excess of the total 
taxes that were due. At the time of 
filing, these taxpayers document their 
overpayment and submit for a refund 
in that amount. 
Overwithholding has been argued 
to have negative consequences for 
taxpayers. A taxpayer who is owed a 
refund on tax day effectively granted 
the IRS a loan: they gave the IRS 
money beyond what they owe in 
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FIGURE 1 DISTRIBUTION OF BALANCE DUE PREDICTED FROM LOSS-AVERSE 
TAX MANIPULATION
FIGURE 2 DISTRIBUTION OF BALANCE DUE FROM OBSERVED TAX RECORDS
Source: Quantifying Loss-Averse Tax Manipulation,” Rev Econ Stud, published online June 28, 2017, 
doi:10.1093/restud/rdx038.
Source: Quantifying Loss-Averse Tax Manipulation,” Rev Econ Stud, published online June 28, 2017, 
doi:10.1093/restud/rdx038.
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taxes, and only receive that money 
back after tax day. In contrast to a 
typical loan, however, the IRS pays 
no interest. As a result, if this money 
were instead, for example, invested in 
an interest-granting financial product 
or used to pay off credit card bills, 
it would have yielded the taxpayer 
greater financial returns. Jones (2012) 
estimated the average foregone inter-
est due to overwithholding to be $63 
in 2004.3 As discussed in that paper, 
there are anecdotal reports of states 
intentionally changing withholding 
policy to try to capture some portion 
of this interest.
If taxpayers are loss averse, the 
burdens of overwithholding on tax-
payers—and the benefits of over-
withholding for government revenue 
generation—are even more substantial 
than these usual opportunity-cost  
calculations would indicate. Over-
withholding not only generates inter-
est income for the government, but 
it also leads to even greater revenue 
generation because it reduces incen-
tives for taxpayers to reduce their 
taxes through manipulation activities. 
Focusing on the interpretation of my 
results for individuals, my estimates 
suggests that the excess transfer to the 
IRS associated with overwithholding 
is 42% higher than one would infer  
by considering interest costs alone. 
And for government revenue, my 
estimates suggests that at least 30% of 
the extra revenue accrued to the gov-
ernment from overwithholding arises 
from loss-averse behavioral responses 
(i.e., reducing motivation for manipu-
lation by presenting taxpayers with 
apparent gains). 
While it has been recognized for 
some time that overwithholding is 
more desirable for the tax authority if 
tax filers are loss-averse,4 my approach 
provides the first estimates of the 
magnitude of these effects. In short, 
loss aversion accounts for a significant 
portion of the costs or benefits of 
policy changes in this domain.
THE POTENTIAL OF FRAMING 
EFFECTS
Conceptually, it may be possible to 
reframe a taxpayer’s perception of what 
constitutes a gain or a loss—poten-
tially through relatively cheap altera-
tions to phrasing or presentation in tax 
documents. In this section, I discuss 
the manner in which such framing 
interventions might be deployed, and 
provide estimates guiding the size of 
the revenue responses that may be 
possible with such interventions. 
1. GAIN FRAMING TO MINIMIZE 
EVASION
Gain framing may prove useful as a 
tool to dissuade evasion among tradi-
tionally noncompliant groups. 
To illustrate the nature of a gain 
framing intervention, consider a small 
business owner. Compared to wage 
and salary income, income from small 
businesses is more likely to be associ-
ated with evasion, due to the greater 
difficulty associated with detect-
ing a misrepresentation of earnings. 
Because this tax filer is in an at-risk 
group for tax evasion, the tax author-
ity could attempt to ensure that this 
taxpayer’s bill is viewed as a gain. One 
potential means of doing so would 
be to provide a report that shows the 
taxes she paid in relation to a group 
of comparable business owners in her 
geographic area or within her indus-
try. Conceptually, such an approach is 
similar to local energy providers who 
supply regular reports to homeowners 
about energy use and efficiency rela-
tive to their neighbors, with the goal 
of decreasing energy use or increas-
ing investments in energy efficient 
appliances. If the government could 
present the small business owner’s tax 
payments on a scale that reframes her 
perceived tax losses as relative gains, 
compared to other people or even 
to herself over time, the payment of 
taxes may be less likely to trigger the 
psychology of loss aversion, and thus 
less likely to be associated with an 
increase in attempts at evasion. Given 
the low-cost of information interven-
tions such as these, such an approach 
has the potential to be cost-effective 
when compared to existing tools for 
dissuading tax evasion, such as audits. 
2. LOSS FRAMING TO MAXIMIZE 
UPTAKE OF TAX INCENTIVES
Many of the credits and deductions 
that constitute legal tax manipulation 
opportunities are rewards for activi-
ties we view as socially desirable. For 
example, they might provide financial 
benefit to those who donate to charity, 
make energy saving improvements 
to their home, or spend on childcare. 
In situations where loss framing can 
be induced, it potentially could be 
applied to intentionally increase tax-
payers’ uptake of these behaviors. 
Concretely, loss framing inter-
ventions would involve making the 
targeted citizens’ tax bill salient, pre-
sented in a way where the tax transfer 
is framed as a loss, and then making 
it clear that this loss can be reduced 
by pursuing a tax-incentivized activ-
ity. For example, charitable institutions 
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could target potential donors in the 
time around tax day, reminding them 
of the tax payments that they are in 
the process of documenting and pre-
senting the potentially desirable option 
of reducing some of those payments 
by making an immediate donation to 
charity. While such loss framing would 
translate into less money collected 
in the form of taxes, it does so in the 
name of directing resources toward 
other socially-beneficial ends.
One complication that arises 
with this approach is that, for many 
tax-incentivized activities, the time at 
which the tax benefits are documented 
and realized will not occur until the 
next calendar year. For example, if a 
tax filer is completing their 2017 tax 
return in April of 2018, an immediate 
donation to charity will only affect the 
next tax return that will be submitted 
in April of 2019. Issues such as these 
have motivated attempts to change the 
deadlines for the claiming of tax ben-
efits for charitable giving from the end 
of the calendar year to tax day of the 
following year, in order to capitalize on 
taxpayers’ immediate desire to mitigate 
tax losses when they become salient 
during tax season.5 Such changes in 
deadlines likely would prove effective 
in the presence of loss aversion. 
3. APPROXIMATING THE POTENTIAL 
REVENUE IMPACT OF FRAMING 
POLICIES
Attempts to influence the gain or loss 
framing adopted by taxpayers may 
provide a quantitatively important 
policy tool to the tax authority. To 
illustrate the potential aggregate con-
sequences, I calculate the predicted 
consequence of large-scale framing 
changes under the assumption that 
the impact of loss framing on manip-
ulation remains similar to what I  
have measured. 
To help illustrate the potential 
magnitude of framing interventions, 
we may compare the predicted differ-
ences in tax manipulation that would 
arise if we transitioned from the status 
quo—in which approximately three 
quarters of taxpayers face a gain on tax 
day—to a world where all taxpayers 
viewed their final tax bill as a gain, or 
to one where all taxpayers viewed their 
tax bill as a loss. My estimates suggest 
that, if all tax filers who currently face 
gains were as motivated to manipulate 
as those facing losses, annual tax rev-
enue would decrease by $3.7 billion. If 
tax filers who face losses experienced 
the lower motivation to manipulate of 
those facing gains, annual tax revenue 
would increase by $1.4 billion. 
Of course, extrapolating to such 
different policy regimes inherently 
involves strong assumptions; and 
indeed, it is unlikely that interven-
tions exist that could control all 
taxpayers’ perceptions of whether 
their tax bill constitutes a gain or 
loss. However, predicted effect sizes 
of this magnitude suggest that even 
attempts at marginal interventions 
might be worthwhile. For example, an 
intervention that leads a mere 1% of 
taxpayers to change their assessment 
of their tax bill from a loss to a gain is 
predicted to increase revenue by $51 
million. While effects of this size are 
small when compared to the national 
budget, capitalizing on this psychol-
ogy can provide a cost-effective means 
of making the most of the tax system 
in place. 
CONCLUSION
A greater understanding of the psy-
chology of the loss-averse taxpayer 
creates new opportunities for policy-
makers. Incorporating this psychol-
ogy into analysis of existing policy 
can assist in accurately predicting 
taxpayer behavior, and in accurately 
predicting the situations in which the 
tax authority should expect evasion. 
Perhaps more interestingly, this psy-
chology provides an opportunity for 
tax authorities to control the incen-
tives for tax manipulation activities by 
controlling the framing of tax gains 
and losses. Through these channels, 
tax manipulation decisions provide a 
setting in which the simple psychol-
ogy of gain/loss framing can generate 
large revenue effects in the aggregate. 
As governments continue to integrate 
ideas from behavioral science into the 
design of policy, attempts to specifi-
cally deploy these ideas to control tax 
morale likely will prove to be useful.
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